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Three points are crucial, and I would urge member states to consider them seriously.  
1. We should measure progress in a way that can guide policy. This requires a single over-
arching measure of how we are doing. The alternative is the easy option of saying that 
lots of things matter. But this does not help us resolve the policy trade-offs. 
2. The right single measure of progress must be the one that is self-evidently good. The 
only such measure is the happiness of the population  - and the equivalent absence of 
misery. This is the proper measure of the quality of life. We should of course combine 
with it the impact of current conditions on the happiness of future generations, and any 
changes in the length of life. 
3. For practical purposes the most practicable measure of happiness is life-satisfaction. 
This has the big advantage for policy-makers that it depends on satisfaction with the 
different domains of life (family, work, community, health, income and so on), which in 
turn depend on specific public policy inputs. It thus provides an indicator for which we 
can develop a causal model that is useful to policy-makers. 
 
1. A SINGLE OVER-ARCHING MEASURE 
Our measure of progress should be the same as the measure we use to evaluate our current 
policy options. For the best policy is the one that leads to the greatest progress. But, when we 
make policy choices, it is not enough to know how a policy affects educational  achievement, 
physical health, environmental quality and so on. There has to be a metric for comparing these 
outcomes in order to say whether one combination of outcomes is better than another. 
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This is essential. It is not enough to simply list the impact of a policy on each human 
“capability”, as Sen argues.1 There must be a way of aggregating these impacts, otherwise we 
shall rarely be able to rank one policy over another – and there are an awful lot of plausible 
policies. 
To assign arbitrary weights to different types of outcome (as in the Human Development 
Index) is not satisfactory. It will inevitably reflect the judgements and perspective of the elite 
who devise the weights. The only justifiable system of weights is that which reflects the 
experience of the population regarding how the different outcomes affect their overall well-
being. 
 
2. HAPPINESS AS THE CRITERION 
So what is that measure of well-being? I think there is one simple test of what is the 
ultimate good for humans – that we find it self-evidently good. So we can list all the goods we 
consider important: freedom, health, achievement, income, happiness and so on. We can then ask 
of each, Why is it good? If we ask, for example, why freedom is good, people will say slavery 
makes people miserable. So does ill-health, and so on. But if we ask, why does it matter if people 
are miserable or happy, no reason can be given.
2
 It is self-evident. 
This is the philosophical reason for the long-established tradition of thought which believes 
that the best societies are those in which there is the most happiness and the least misery. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this was a commonplace view, and it helped to usher in a 
more humane social order. But in the early twentieth century it took a severe blow from the 
growth of philosophical scepticism about whether you could know how anyone else felt. This 
was compounded by the behaviourist revolution in psychology which believed that all you could 
study was behaviour and not feelings or motives. 
Fortunately psychology has changed track in the last fifty years, and returned to the view 
that feelings have an objective reality. For example, researchers have correlated the happiness 
which an individual self-reports and the corresponding estimate made by a friend. The 
correlation is good – which (when you think of it) is an essential condition for effective 
friendship and social life. But more decisive in the intellectual debate has been the discovery by 
neuro-psychologists of the areas of the brain where happiness and misery are experienced. Here 
we have good correlations (both across time and across individuals) of self-reported happiness 
and electronic readings in the brain. This I believe should settle the argument about whether our 
feeling have sufficient objective reality to be taken very seriously. 
 I just gave a philosophical reason for taking them seriously. This is reinforced by the 
corresponding empirical finding that when people are asked what they most want in life the 
majority reply “To be happy”.  
                                                     
1 Sen (2009). Sen points out that if policies are ranked on a number of dimensions some will be dominated by others on all 
dimensions. But this „partial ordering‟ is not enough – too many policies will remain unranked against each other. 
2 For re positive and negative. 
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 Before going further, let me deal with the obvious question: “Are you advocating that 
everybody should pursue their own selfish happiness?” The answer of course is No, for two 
reasons. First, if everyone is selfish, all will lose from the selfishness of others. But second the 
selfish individual will himself lose (even if others are unselfish). For psychology shows that, as 
people come to care more about the happiness of others, they themselves become happier.
 3
 
 So happiness and misery are the key indicators of the quality of life. This is really 
fortunate because it relieves policy-makers of making judgements about how different 
dimensions of experience should be weighted – we accept the internal valuations which 
spontaneously occur within individuals. 
 There are however two further items which need to be incorporated before we have a 
complete measure of progress.  
1. Life expectancy. Clearly people value life-years as well as the quality of each life year. On 
certain assumptions we can multiply the two together to get a measure of Quality Adjusted 
Life Years.
4
 We should do this using overall quality of life and not the „health-related‟ quality 
of life studied by health economists. 
2. Impact on future generations. The happiness of future generations matters as much as our 
own. So it should not count as progress if what we now enjoy is at the expense of the future. 
This issue has been discussed at length in the Stiglitz report
5
 and I agree with their general 
approach in terms of stocks of assets. 
 
3.      PRACTICALITIES: LIFE-SATISFACTION 
The measure 
This brings me to the practical issues. We need a measure that has already been intensively 
studied and whose properties are well known. For example it would help if we already had a 
causal model for how it is determined, and it would be particularly helpful if the determinants 
corresponded to different spheres of life which policy-makers recognise. 
Of all the measures of subjective well-being, life-satisfaction has been the most intensively 
studied.
6
 In one extremely helpful approach life-satisfaction depends on satisfaction with the 
different domains of life (see Figure). And domain-satisfaction depends in turn on more detailed 
causes including public service delivery and satisfaction with the service. It thus provides 
information of real use to policy-makers. 
                                                     
3 Lyubomirsky (2008)  
4 This requires a time trade-off approach, through which any „cardinal‟ quality-of-life measure is turned into a „ratio‟ scale. 
5 Stiglitz et al (2009) 
6 See for example Helliwell in Diener, Helliwell and Kahneman (eds. forthcoming). As the three editors point out, life-
satisfaction lies between the two ends of a spectrum  ranging from pure affect-based measures of well-being to more purely 
judgemental measures. 
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Uses 
So how would a policy-maker use regularly-collected data? There are many ways. 
1. He would monitor trends in the aggregate life of the community and see which areas 
are going better and which worse. 
2. He would look hard at the distribution  of well-being, and see who is in misery and 
who is flourishing. 
From 1 and 2 he would get ideas for policy change. There are then two ways in which he could 
assess these possible changes in terms of their effect on overall life-satisfaction: 
3. One would be to use his causal model to form an impression of what difference an 
action might make – by summing the effects down the different channels indicated in 
the diagram. 
4. A more exact estimate would come from a controlled experiment. 
In every case the final outcome of course would be the life-satisfaction of the population, and the 
policy-maker might wish to give more weight to reductions in misery, compared with increases 
in happiness. That would be an ethical choice but all other steps in the analysis would be based 
on positive social science. It seems to me highly likely that this type of quantitative analysis will 
become routine practice in many governments within the next 20-30 years.  
 I have been involved in cost-benefit analysis using the money metric for 40 years. But 
its weakness becomes increasingly apparent – it inevitably ignores income distribution (treating 
each dollar as equivalent) and it cannot handle many of the most important influences on human 
happiness which are social influences not amenable to willing-to-pay analysis. The concept of 
QALY used in health research is much better but, as practised, it involves arbitrary weighting of 
different dimensions of well-being. So, once again, we come to the over-arching criterion of life-
satisfaction. I believe we shall get there but only if we are single-minded and rigorous about it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 It is wonderful that the OECD has taken this initiative to find a better concept of 
progress. But it would be a tragedy if current scepticism about the GDP criterion led to no 
substantive changes of policy, due to disagreement about a coherent alternative. The money 
metric has a strong but limited logic. It will only be displaced by some other metric. If what we 
ultimately value is the quality of human experience, that metric should be centred on happiness 
and misery. 
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